It has become fashionable to complain about the European Union.

Governments of the Members States will evade their responsibilities by charging all ills to Brussels when a policy gets contested, and they never acknowledge that such policies were adopted by the Council of the European Union, unanimously for important matters, which means by themselves. Only the Council has the power to define the European policies, the parliament has practically very little influence beside a posterori controls. It approves some laws but has no legislative initiative of its own.  The Commission, often blamed of abusing its power, has actually little autonomy in shaping the destiny of the Union. It must execute the decisions taken by the heads of government of the Member States. And a vote at the qualified majority of Member State representatives is made when technical matters need to be settled.

The engine of the European « machin » (as Charles de Gaulle was calling it) is indeed not that monstrous. A large part of its internal operational budget is due to its linguistic diversity (24 official languages). The Union’s budget, funded by Member State contributions, is equivalent to 1% of the sum of the GDP of all the members, and 94 % of this budget is redistributed back to them to finance various programmes, of which 30% are dedicated to direct subsidies for agriculture. It must be said also that small parts of the budgets of the Member States are also used to participate in common tasks. Without this, mostly the work of various experts, the Union’s activities could not be mastered within the relatively small Brussels structure.

But Europe disturbs.

The most important power of the Commission is its nuisance power as its activities are perceived in each area where countries’ habits and traditions will be questioned. A common decision always implies that some sovereignty will be abandoned, and that is difficult to sell at home in each country. Also, by attributing subsidies the Commission will be revered by various lobbies but at the same time will be abhorred for the dependency that it creates. The corrupt dislikes the briber because he depends on him.

In more political areas one shall realize that the European Union is a rather empty shell. Social protection is jealously kept under the authority of the Member States. In foreign affairs some countries are quite happy to be under the Union’s umbrella but large ones, in particular France and the United Kingdom, don’t see any advantage of transferring that historical sovereignty. The same applies for defence where putting resources in common and designating an operational command organisation are facing high barriers since a long time. Looked at from outside, the European Union is considered as an important but not perceived as a necessary construct.

Although the activities of the EU in many domains are quite open and transparent they are felt as fearsome. Whoever has already been involved in the work of one or the other institution, committee, consultation, etc. will have observed the extreme complexity of the machine and the excessive precaution with which any subject matter will be tackled. This is bureaucracy, on-going and in a showcase. Everyone knows that it may be worse in the individual countries but this will be easily ignored since local institutions were built over time within a longer historic frame. In a country one’s neighbour may be a state employee, a banal and normal person; but almost nobody knows the species “European public servant”, except in and around Brussels. This guy is a mysterious one and is under the suspicion of enjoying many undue privileges, which is partly true.

And there is a case against the representativeness and the legitimacy of the Union, not for the Member States but for their citizens who remain quite remote from the Union’s institutions. Once every five years they elect a weak parliament by a proportional vote where most issues are considered of low stake. The Union is perceived as a technocratic construct, if not autocratic, the actors of which, before all the Commissioners, are designated by dark negotiations. A democratic deficit is clearly perceived about the representativeness of the persons involved and about the build-up of a European public opinion.

From outside the Union is seen as a fat lame duck, even an impotent one. Never negotiations are engaged with the sole Union. One remembers the question attributed to Henry Kissinger “Europe, what phone number should I call?” Technical matters are dealt with by the Commission but in case of institutional issues or subsidiarity questions multilateral talks are necessary. If to agree with the United States one should convince each and every State, the US international relations would be quite impaired. That is what happens with the European Union. Europe signature is only valid if its members agree unanimously, which is difficult to attain.

Nevertheless the European construction exists. After the conflicts of the 20^th century an inner peace was established that can now be thought as sustainable, this is no minor achievement. Within the Union terms of exchange were defined, commercial but also scientific and cultural ones, common norms were adopted, entire regions could be modernized, and free movement of persons was established. The integration is still incomplete but in good progression.

Thus, at the light of all recriminations about this unfinished project, what goals, what strategy and what form should be given to Europe to satisfy most of its inhabitants?

Roughly there are three possible ways that can be followed, each one having profound implications for the life of anyone and of each community:

1. obstinacy on the already engaged route
2. dismembering, total or partial
3. sublimation to a federal state

Obstinacy

This is the most probable route because all actors know how to play this score. With a subtle mix of progresses and constraints every state and every individual will be kept in a relative comfort, protests being damped by well distributed subsidies. Local (national) politics remains at the lead and governments find pragmatic agreements to enable this “thing” to function. The Commission continues to consider itself as indispensable and the number and the name of the Commissioners remain widely unknown. The Parliament remains a recycling station for local worn out politicians or would like candidates. As long as budgets are under the sole responsibility of the member States and that no direct or indirect European taxes will be perceived, national citizens will continue to have no interest for the Union besides complaining about it. Uprising could only happen if big governance mistakes would be made.

On the long term this scenario leads to decadence in front of a world that develops itself with totally different dynamics, without being concerned about what happens or not on the old continent

In such scenario the question will constantly be asked about the purpose of the Union, to be or not to be. A long lasting temporary solution.

Dismantling

Dismantling can be made alongside two directions, one by Member states leaving the Union to build up, or not, another one, the other by putting some prerogatives of the Union back in the hand of the Member States. In the first case it would be much more problematic if France or the UK would be leaving than if it were Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. But for a leaving country it would be extremely difficult not to take into its own laws past and future standards of the Union. Thus there would be a futile reason, hence populist, to make secession if bilateral treaties would recreate conditions similar to those existing within the Union. And if the purpose would be to radically change the national policies, then the former partners from the Union may consider that biased trade conditions would be imposed and that unfair competition would result. These are sources of conflict that may lead quite far, as history teaches us.

On the other hand reducing the weight at the centre to shift competencies back to the countries would be a complex task, also an ineffective one. The huge package of laws and regulations developed over decades in Brussels should be revisited and rewritten in 28 national capital cities, of course in a simpler and smarter way, but as difficult to conceive and to implement.

And what would happen after such change: what goal, what position on the world stage would remain for the residual part of such restructured union and for the individual states that would have somehow reduce their dependency?

It appears quite clearly that when such a union has been constructed, de-structuring it will be very difficult without creating huge conflicts.

Sublimation

This is what eurosceptics are most afraid of, who think themselves capable of living with the first scenario, and even better with the second one, but not at all with this one.

Models to follow could be those of the United States or of the Swiss Confederation. It consists in delegating legislative and executive competencies at a level where all democratic functions can be applied: implementation of a constitution and of the corresponding institutions, elections, build-up of a government, sovereign legislation, popular controls by the mean of referendums or popular initiatives, independent courts of justice, central tax perception (and therefore reduction in local states…), equilibrated budgets, etc.

As in Switzerland the Canton of Zug or Glarus, or in the USA Rhode Island or Wyoming, a small country would find itself well hosted and would appreciate institutions that respect and protect the interests of the « forgettable regions » as well as the priorities of large urban or geographic entities.

This requires the limits to central competencies, the so-called subsidiarity, would be clearly defined in a simple and understandable constitution rather than in voluminous treaties that nobody knows anymore their details. This requires also an authority over the local constituents in those sovereign domains that are attributed to the centre, authority that will find its legitimacy by the adoption of the constitution, by elections and votes that are made simultaneously by all European citizens.

Of course there will be details to be settled, competitiveness of an agriculture respecting the environment and facing more lax conditions abroad, normalized shape of electric plugs, approval or ban of new drugs, etc. But this will be made under a more direct and much more democratic controls of the institutions than it is the case today.

With a sole common currency adjustments for structural and conjunctural differences should be avoided that would consist in varying salaries as today in Germany, or unemployment as in France, or both as in southern Europe. An equalization system needs to be in place involving budget transfers between regions and countries, as it happens today within each Member States. But it will be necessary to verify that no corruptive undue subventions or controls would be made at the sole taste of the central authority.

Some will resent inacceptable losses : the French president (if France would still need such character) will no more be able to engage war, the Greek administration will no more be able to cheat about state accounts, the Catalan region will have no more interest in asking for its independence. But the people will gain by a better institutional efficiency (as long as a complexity “à la française” will not be built), a more competitive Europe within the World cacophony of nations, and the sense to be a citizen in his own right within such community.

This entails also risks, the firsts of which being vanity, hypertrophy, and media overexploitation of such new institutions. Another one lies with the fierce opposition of powerful conservative circles (of all political orientations), in particular in large countries that have never put fundamentally in question their political culture (France, United Kingdom).

But the major risk of this scenario is that it will never be tried, or in such a timid way that it will, at best, resemble to the first obstinacy scenario.

Options for Switzerland

A crisis arises from the result of the vote of February 9, 2014, which accepted at a thin 50.3% majority to question the free movement of persons between the EU and Switzerland. And at this stage it is impossible to anticipate if this crisis will be salutary or not. At least it reveals that opinions are quite diverse and that, as eurocrats fear like plague, it could spread within the Union’s member countries. All owners of the European institutions reacted in this direction. This may give weight to the Swiss position, but it may enrage its European partner who might be tempted to make an example, which is easier with a small non-member country than with a Member State.

As long as the Union stubbornly continues on its actual path the best interest of Switzerland is to conclude only single treaties, without automatic adaptation to legislative changes that the European Union may later decide. If a wider institutional agreement would be concluded that would include such automatism it would be at its great disadvantage as compared to individual Member State which can opt out from certain clauses when new legislation is prepared. Switzerland must also categorically refuse the appointment of foreign judges who could be competent to annul decisions voted according our laws and habits. Of course no futile debate should be open on technical questions and logical adaptations, but on essential matters yes, such as people’s referendum rights inscribed in our Constitution. If Switzerland does not accept automatic legal adaptation and foreign judges, the European Union cannot impose it, this is called non-negotiable.

If the Union would go along some dismantling path then the bilateral way would be even more justified, serving as a basis to re-establish agreements with each state or group of states who would have made secession.

And at last, if Europe would be sublimating to evolve to a federation, Switzerland would have little difficulties to join it. But it will be necessary to see it before believing it! In any case it is certain that Switzerland will not never join the Union in its current form.

We will know, I hope, how to play the subtle diplomatic game that has characterized us so far (alas, there were exceptions) and take best advantage of its direct democracy, the « killer argument » against any authoritarian form that, by treaty, one would try to impose to us.  To make an example it is now necessary to take back the formal request for adhesion (that is still sleeping) in order to make the point of its current impossibility and to put Europe in front of its responsibilities: it must live in good harmony with its neighbours, in particular when the trade balance is in its favour, as it is with Switzerland.

To achieve this the Federal Council, supported by a multi-partisan majority in the National Council and the State Council, must formulate a clear and unambiguous policy. The challenge will be even higher with the February 9 vote. The recent declarations of the President of the Confederation go into the right direction but do not describe precisely enough the chosen strategy neither do they express forcefully enough the necessary determination. It is no sign of weakness to tell what we want in advance to the other party; opening on the offense is better than timid rear-guard defence.

It has now become indispensable that a vast majority in Switzerland supports its European policy; and that includes populists from the UDC/SVP party who, as coward snakes in the pit, are looking forward to any stumbling of the Federal Council, which is an unpatriotic posture. We aren’t used to publish such programmes, in the case of our relations with Europe it becomes indispensable to have the courage to do so.

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